一家厂商的短期收益为R=10e-e²。其中e为一个典型工人(所有工人都假设为是完全一样的)的

一家厂商的短期收益为R=10e-e²。其中e为一个典型工人（所有工人都假设为是完全一样的)的

努力水平。工人选择他的收入减去努力以后的净工资w-e(努力的单位成本假设为1)最大化的努力水平。根据下列每种工资安排，确定努力水平和利润水平(收入减去支付的工资)。解释为什么这些不同的委托-代理关系产生不同的结果。

(1)对于e≥1, w=2;否则w=0。

(2)w=R/2。

(3)w=R-12.5。

A firm's short-run revenue is given by R= 10e-e2 , where e is the level of effort by a typical worker (all workers are assumed to be identical). A worker chooses his level of effort to maximize his wage net of effort w-e (the per-unit cost of effort is assumed to be 1). Determine the level of effort and the level of profit (revenue less wage paid) for each of the following wage arrangements.

Explain why these differing principal-agent relationships generate different outcomes.

a. w=2 for e≥1; otherwise w =0,

b. w= R/2.

c. w=R-12.5.